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HOLMES v. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP.: A
DISAPPOINTING ATTEMPT TO LIMIT RICO AcTIONS
FOR SECURmES FRAUD
I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)'
has emerged as a prominent force in the legal community.2 Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. 3 was supposed to be the turning point in
RICO litigation-the solution for the questions concerning the scope of
RICO in civil litigation, especially securities fraud. 4 Many lawyers
hoped that the United States Supreme Court would use the case to re-
solve the much-disputed issue of whether a plaintiff had to be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities in order to maintain a RICO action for
securities fraud. In a surprising decision the Court avoided the pur-
chaser-seller question, and instead held that the RICO violation must
constitute a direct, or proximate, cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 5
Holmes's immediate impact on the RICO statute and securities law
appears equivocal. This Comment discusses the ambiguities of the
RICO/securities fraud issue, speculates how the lower courts will inter-
pret Holmes and draws the conclusion that courts should apply the pur-
chaser-seller standing requirements of the federal securities laws when
resolving a case involving RICO and securities fraud.
II. BACKGROUND
A. RICO
Congress initially enacted Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,6 better known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), to assist law enforcement in fighting organ-
ized crime, 7 but the legislature also included explicit language allowing
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
2. Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "'Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases
Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 674 (1990).
3. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
4. See David Tobenkin, Supreme Court Ruling May Rewrite Securities Law, Los ANGELES
Bus. J., Nov. 11, 1991, § 1, at 5; High Court To Weigh Limits Of Securities-Linked RICO Claims,
WALL ST. LETTER, Nov. 11, 1991, at 2 (predicting that the "fate of applicability of the
securities seller/purchaser test under RICO ... will certainly be determined").
5. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322.
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
7. In the introduction to the Act, the legislature stated:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Id. See also Michael N. Glanz, Note, RICO and Securities Fraud A Workable Limitation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1983).
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for civil actions by persons injured "by reason of" a RICO violation. 8
To constitute a violation, a person involved in an "enterprise" 9 must
participate in a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 0 RICO specifies a
number of predicate offenses that constitute racketeering activity, in-
cluding "fraud in the sale of securities."" Civil remedies for a RICO
violation include treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees.
12
Since the enactment of RICO, commentators have debated the
scope of the predicate offense concerning securities fraud. 1 Legislative
history provides inadequate support for a plausible interpretation.
14
Congress did not include securities fraud as a predicate offense in the
early drafts of RICO, but added it later before enacting the statute.' 5
The current debate centers around whether Congress intended to in-
clude the purchaser-seller standing requirement of Rule 1Ob-5,1 6 or any




Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193418 and Rule
lOb-51 9 are the statutory means by which the Securities and Exchange
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
9. Id. § 1961(4). The term "enterprise" encompasses "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals asso-
ciated in fact although not a legal entity." Id
10. Id § 1961(5). The statute describes a "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
11. Id. § 1961(1)(D).
12. Id. § 1964(c).
13. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets: The
Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 896, 944- 45 (1990); Glanz,
supra note 7, at 1516-17.
14. Thomas W. Alvey, III, Note, Puncturing The RICO Balloon: The Judicial Imposition Of
The lOb-5 Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 41 WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 193, 200 (1992).
See also Andrew P. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud In The Sale Of Securi-
ties", 18 GA. L. REV. 43, 58 (1983) (recognizing four potential interpretations of "fraud in
the sale of securities").
15. Bridges, supra note 14, at 58-59.
16. See Harvey.L. Pitt et al., Once Again, the Court Fails to Rein in RICO, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1992, at 31 (stating that the "genesis" of the debate is the purchaser-seller
requirement).
17. Mathews, supra note 13, at 944.
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Recently, the Supreme Court limited actions filed under Rule lOb-5 by adopting "the
,one year from discovery, three years from the event' statute of limitations, derived from
other sections of the 1934 Act." Joseph Cachey, Lampf v. Gilbertson: Rule lOb-5's Time
[Vol. 70:2
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Commission (SEC) enforces federal laws governing securities fraud.
The important case history of the purchaser-seller requirement began
with Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.20 In Birnbaum, a group of stockhold-
ers sued Newport Steel, its president and the directors of the corpora-
tion for alleged securities fraud. 2 ' The defendants shunned a
potentially profitable merger for the plaintiff-stockholders and instead
sold their own shares to a third company at a substantial premium to the
current market price. 22 In affirming the lower court's dismissal for fail-
ure to state a cause of action, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided that Congress constructed Rule lOb-5 specifi-
cally for fraud involving the purchase or sale of securities, not for man-
agement's fraudulent supervision of corporate matters.2 3 The court
held that a person who fails to qualify as a purchaser or a seller of securi-
ties may not sustain a securities fraud claim based on Rule lOb-5.
24
Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court upheld the Birnbaum
rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,2 5 a significant decision for
securities fraud. The case involved an offering of securities by a newly
formed corporation, Blue Chip Stamps, to customers of the old Blue
Chip Stamp Co. The plaintiffs, customers who did not purchase stock,
claimed that the prospectus issued prior to the offering discouraged
them from buying shares so that the company could reoffer the stock to
the public at a higher price.2 6 The plaintiffs brought a class action suit
for profits lost in not buying the stock, the price of which increased sub-
sequent to the public offering. 2 7 The Supreme Court applied the Birn-
baum rule and held that only purchasers and sellers of securities have
standing to sue for a violation of Rule lOb-5. 28 The Court grounded its
opinion on legislative history, precedential developments since Birnbaum
and several public policy considerations.2 9 The policy factors looked at
by the Court included the consequences that lawsuits would have on the
defendant's daily business activities, the ability of plaintiffs to use
groundless claims to enhance the settlement value of their case and fact
issues that hinged on oral testimony, further reducing the chances of
settlement.3 0 The Court expressed deep concern about the potential
for "vexatious litigation" 3' and perceived that the benefit of preventing
frivolous suits outweighed the undesirable effects of excluding those
Has Come, 69 DENv. U. L. REV. 135 (analyzing the split in the circuits regarding the proper
statute of limitations and the Court's resolution of the earlier uncertainties).
20. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
21. Id. at 462.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 464.
24. Id. at 463. This holding became known as the Birnbaum rule. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
25. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
26. Id. at 726.
27. Id. at 727.
28. Id. at 754-55.
29. Glen E. Mercer, Note, Violation of Rule lOb-5 As a Predicate Act Under Civil RICO, 51
LA. L. REV. 1111, 1112-14 (1991).
30. Id. at 1114.
31. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739-45.
19931
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persons actually damaged by a Rule lOb-5 violation.3 2
The number of securities fraud cases involving RICO soared in the
mid-1980's 33 as frustrated investors who failed to meet the purchaser-
seller requirement in Rule lOb-5 began using RICO as a tool to avoid
the standing limitation. The broad language used in the statute3 4 and
the liberal interpretation that the courts exercised 35 contributed signifi-
cantly to the move to RICO. As plaintiffs began combining RICO with
securities fraud actions, the judicial system experienced difficulties sort-
ing out the differences in the securities laws and RICO. The privilege to
bring suit under Rule lOb-5 arises from an implied cause of action de-
veloped by the courts. 3 6 Birnbaum further limited the implied right to
purchasers and sellers of securities. 3 7 Yet, the provisions of the above
securities laws did not appear in the language of RICO, 38 although the
SEC had initiated federal laws governing securities fraud long before
Congress ever considered RICO.3 9 Confusion determining the stand-
ing requirement needed to bring a RICO claim in a securities action
results from this omission.
C. Standing
A plaintiff suing under RICO has standing to sue only if an injury
has occurred as a result of conduct prohibited by the statute. 40 The
confusion over whether the standing requirements of the securities laws
apply to a RICO action based on securities fraud resulted in divided
courts and ambiguous law. 4 1 In International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 42 a
corporation sued the two individuals who initially started the business,
claiming that the two falsified information in a prospectus and caused
the corporation to suffer losses. 4 3 The Fourth Circuit asserted that the
32. Id at 743. Much of the disagreement concerning the purchaser-seller issue results
from excluded plaintiffs, such as an owner of a security who does not sell because of the
fraudulent behavior. Thus, even if a distressed investor exists, he is unable to sue because
of the purchaser-seller limitation. Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Agency on Stock-Fraud
Suits, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at C2.
33. Alvey, supra note 14, at 194-95.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (RICO "shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
35. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (asserting that the lan-
guage of RICO should not be limited); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497
(1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly.").
36. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (investors con-
vinced to sell stock for much less than actual value sustained a cause of action under the
securities laws because "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies.").
37. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
38. Alvey, supra note 14, at 204.
39. Congress enacted the securities laws in 1933 and 1934 and RICO in 1970.
40. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
41. Mathews, supra note 13, at 947; Mercer, supra note 29, at 1121 (asserting that it is
"equally plausible that Congress meant to retain the Birnbaum rule [in RICO] as it is that
Congress meant to overturn it").
42. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 150.
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purchaser-seller standing requirement applies to RICO claims based on
securities fraud.4 4 The court held that because the corporation and its
officers and directors were not purchasers or sellers of stock, all lacked
standing to sue.4 5 Because Congress did not explicitly state any limita-
tion, the court followed the precedent established in securities fraud ac-
tions,4 6 the Birnbaum rule.
4 7
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co. 48
lies in direct contrast to the holding in International Data Bank. Warner
was a customer of ESM Government Securities and a principal in two
banks that were also ESM customers. He sued the company's auditors,
claiming they filed false and misleading reports regarding the financial
condition of ESM. 4 9 Although Warner could not maintain an action
under the federal securities laws, the court stated that he need not meet
the purchaser-seller requirement to sustain a RICO claim based on se-
curities fraud. 50 The court simply stated that a plaintiff "need only al-
lege injuries personally sustained as a result of conduct violative of the
federal RICO statute."'' l The Ninth Circuit added to the disarray
among the circuits by omitting the purchaser-seller limitation in Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 52 the precursor to the instant case. 53
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
Congress established the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion (SIPC), a nonprofit private corporation, 54 following the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970.55 The SIPC is comprised of broker-
dealers required to become members upon registration with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. 56 In establishing the SIPC, Congress
provided the agency, inter alia, with the authority to seek the liquidation
of a broker-dealer's business to meet customers' obligations when the
level of its assets indicated a failure or a threat of failure. 57
In 1981, the SIPC began liquidation proceedings against two bro-
ker-dealers. The SIPC claimed that the broker-dealers had insufficient
assets to meet the obligations of their customers and that it disbursed
over $13 million to cover the shortage. 58 Subsequently, the SIPC filed
44. Id. at 151.
45. Id. at 151-53.
46. Id. at 152.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
48. 828 F.2d 1528 (11 h Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 1529.
50. Id. at 1530.
51. Id.
52. 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
53. Id. at 1467.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(1) (1988).
55. Id. §§ 78aaa-78111.
56. Id. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A).
57. Id. § 78eee.
58. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1315 (1992).
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suit against Holmes and 75 other defendants, claiming that they em-
ployed the broker-dealers in a scheme to inflate the price of the shares
of several companies and create the misconception that a stable market
existed for the stocks. 59 The discovery of the scheme caused a dramatic
decline in the price of the shares of these companies, and the stock
owned in the proprietary accounts of the two broker-dealers sustained
huge losses.6 ° The SIPC claimed that the defendants violated Section
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5, the mail and
wire fraud statutes6 ' and the federal RICO laws.
62
B. Lower Courts
The SIPC filed the original lawsuit in 1983 in district court in Cali-
fornia.63 The first two appellate court decisions involving these parties
concerned different procedural matters.64 In the third decision, the dis-
trict court held the SIPC did not have proper standing to bring a RICO
claim and defendant's actions were not the proximate cause of the losses
sustained, so the SIPC appealed.6 5 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that the
purchaser-seller limitation in Rule lob-5 does not apply to RICO claims
based on securities fraud.6 6 The court of appeals decided that the lower
court erred in granting summary judgment on the proximate cause issue
because a fact question remained as to whether a causal connection ex-
isted between the defendant's actions and the broker-dealers' losses.
6 7
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on only one issue: whether
the SIPC has the right to bring a securities fraud action under RICO.
6 8
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court reversed and remanded the
decision of the court of appeals. The Court held the SIPC failed to state
a claim because the alleged actions by the defendant were not a proxi-
mate cause of the SIPC's losses.6 9 The majority refused to address the
question of whether RICO required a party to be a purchaser or seller in
order to bring a claim based on securities fraud. 70 Instead, it found
59. Id.
60. Id
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
62. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1315.
63. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 587 F. Supp. 1358 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
64. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986)
(reversing lower court decision to dismiss SIPC's lOb-5 claim); Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing the district court's decision
to dismiss four defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue).
65. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.
1990).
66. Id. at 1467.
67. Id. at 1468-69.
68. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1316 (1992).




a discussion of the problem unnecessary and not relevant to the
decision.
7 1
In determining that RICO requires proximate cause to sustain an
action, the majority focused on specific language in the RICO statute:
"[any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion" 7 2 may bring an action. Relying on statutory history, 73 Souter con-
cluded that Congress fashioned § 1964(c) of RICO after Section 4 of the
Clayton Act,74 which itself imitated language from Section 7 of the Sher-
man Act.75 Souter stated that courts repeatedly interpreted the Sher-
man Act as requiring proximate causation and the Supreme Court
previously held that the Clayton Act required proof of proximate
cause. 76 The Court therefore found by analogy that RICO also requires
proximate cause.
7 7
Souter relied on several policy initiatives to justify his use of proxi-
mate cause. First, the further removed an injury is from the violation,
the harder to trace particular damages back to the infraction. 78 Second,
to avoid multiple recoveries, courts would be forced to develop intricate
rules for the apportionment of damages among differently injured plain-
tiffs. 79 Third, plaintiffs injured directly will bring private lawsuits and
avoid those problems faced by remotely injured parties, thus reducing
the societal demand for deterrence of the violations. 80
The Court refused to address the purchaser-seller issue despite urg-
ing by appellant Holmes and dissension among the lower courts. 8 ' Sou-
ter found the instant case untimely for a settlement of the issue
8 2
because the lower courts could have used proximate cause to decide the
conflicting cases.8 3 Furthermore, none of the cases involved parties
who failed to qualify as a purchaser or seller because of reliance on a
broker's advice, as occurred in Blue Chip Stamps.
8 4
D. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Stevens, addressed
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1316 (citing 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
73. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assoc.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
74. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
75. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
76. For a discussion of the enactment of § 4 of the Clayton Act based on language
from § 7 of the Sherman Act, see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
77. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317-18.
78. Id. at 1318.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 40-52.
82. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322. "[O]ur discussion of the issue would be unnecessary to
the resolution of this case. Nor do we think that leaving this question unanswered will
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the question on which the Court granted certiorari. The Justices con-
cluded that a plaintiff can sustain a RICO action based on securities
fraud without meeting the purchaser-seller requirement. 85 O'Connor
argued for a strict reading of the statement in the RICO statute author-
izing "any person" to sue and determined that courts should not impose
the purchaser-seller requirement of Rule lOb-5 in a RICO action. 86 In
her opinion, Congress chose to institute a private right of action for
plaintiffs without requiring a purchase or sale of securities and the Court
should not impede the intentions of Congress.
8 7
As to the majority's use of causation to decide the case, O'Connor
seemed satisfied with the assertion that proximate cause emerged as an
element of the question before the Court.8 8 In her opinion, however,
the requirement of a proximate connection between the injury or harm
and the defendant's conduct should not prevent one who lacks pur-
chaser-seller standing from bringing a civil RICO action.
8 9
E. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor that the purchaser-
seller requirement should not apply to civil RICO actions based on se-
curities fraud, but he surmised that "[t]he ultimate question here is stat-
utory standing .... ."90 Courts must first determine if the "nexus"
between the plaintiff's harm and the defendant's conduct supports a
RICO cause of action. 9 1 The question of proximate cause only factors
into the standing equation because, without express directions other-
wise from a legislature, courts always consider proximate cause in decid-
ing questions of recovery.
9 2
In Justice Scalia's opinion, the purchaser-seller requirement falls
under another element of statutory standing, the "zone-of-interest"
test.9 3 This test ascertains if the plaintiff falls within the category of per-
sons served by the particular rule. 94 Courts should apply this test, along
with the proximate cause test, in determining whether a plaintiff has
standing to sue.9 5 Similar to Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia theorized
that the Court should not imply any limitation into RICO because Con-
gress created the statute and elected not to limit the rights of civil RICO
plaintiffs. 96
85. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1323. "Insofar as 'any' encompasses 'all', the words 'any person' cannot
reasonably be read to mean only purchasers and sellers of securities." Id. (citation
ommitted).
87. Id. at 1327.
88. Id. at 1322.
89. Id. at 1324.
90. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1327 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. "Life is too short to pursue every human act to its most remote conse-
quences." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1328.
94. Id.
95. Id.




Aside from the fact that the Court sidestepped the most important
issue-standing-it made an appropriate decision in denying the SIPC
relief because of a lack of causation. As Justice Souter noted, courts
generally utilize proximate cause "to limit a person's responsibility for
the consequences of that person's own acts."' 97 Assuming Holmes actu-
ally committed the alleged acts, the broker-dealers' collapse could be
attributed to many other possible factors, making it impossible to im-
pute full responsibility to Holmes. 98 Other possible causes included the
failure of the broker-dealers to diversify assets, poor supervision of the
business and weak market conditions.
99
By requiring that a proximate relationship exist between a defend-
ant's violation and the plaintiff's injuries, the Court tightened a fixture
of RICO.' 0 0 For the first time, the Court restricted the breadth of
RICO,' 0 ' despite contrary language in both the statute 10 2 and prior
Supreme Court cases. 10 3 However, because the Court dodged the ques-
tion upon which it granted certiorari, two approaches to interpreting
Holmes emerged. A lower court may adopt either approach, depending
on its Circuit's rule on the purchaser-seller issue prior to the decision.
A. The Purchaser-Seller Limitation Does Not Apply To RICO Actions Based
On Securities Fraud
Courts may interpret the concurring opinions in Holmes as the fu-
ture of the law,' 0 4 given the 5-4 split on the purchaser-seller issue. 0 5
Courts could choose not to apply the purchaser-seller requirement and
instead follow Souter's lead by using proximate cause as the sole basis
for deciding RICO actions. This interpretation supports the argument
that, while courts have implied a cause of action under Rule lOb-5,10 6
97. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.
98. Id. at 1320.
99. Id.
100. See Pitt, supra note 16, at 31 (stating that the Court "pronounced a black-letter
legal requirement that had, prior to the grant of certiorari, already been thought to have
been well-established in RICO jurisprudence.").
101. Edward Brodsky, RICO - Limitation And Expansion, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 8, 1992, at 3.
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (RICO "shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
103. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (asserting that the lan-
guage of RICO should not be limited); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497
(1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly.").
104. Brodsky, supra note 101, at 3. See also Greenhouse, supra, note 32, at C2 ("With
four Justices already on record, it is likely the Court will resolve the issue in favor of
investors.").
105. Andrew Leigh, Supreme Court Ruling Has Weakened RICO-Maybe, INVESTOR's Bus.
DAILY, Mar. 27, 1992, at 8.
106. The first case to find an implied private right of action under Rule lOb-5 was
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Investors convinced to
sell stock for much less than actual value sustained a cause of action under the securities
laws because "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient
to negative what the general law implies."). The Supreme Court later endorsed the hold-
ing in Kardom. See Superintendent of Insurance of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
1993]
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Congress expressly provided for a private cause of action under RICO
and courts are compelled to abide by the legislature's explicit direc-
tions. 10 7 Thus, the onus stays with Congress, and not the courts, to im-
pose a purchaser-seller limitation for RICO actions,10 8 a situation
favored by both O'Connor 0 9 and Scalia. I 10
Based on their earlier rulings favoring the liberal approach to
RICO,"'1 the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits will likely favor the concur-
rences' approach to the purchaser-seller issue. Both courts relied heav-
ily on the textual argument that RICO, on its face, does not contain any
standing requirement as provided for by Rule lOb-5." t 2 Thus, until
Congress explicitly adds a standing clause specifically for securities
fraud actions, these courts are apt to hold on to their prior convictions
until expressly directed otherwise.
Such an interpretation implies substantial consequences, opening
the door to a multitude of plaintiffs kept out of the courts by the pur-
chaser-seller limitation.11 3 Permitting indirectly injured plaintiffs to sue
would create "massive and complex damages litigation [which] not only
burdens the courts, but also undermines the effectiveness of treble-dam-
ages suits." 1 14 Disastrous effects on the securities industry could mate-
rialize, as persons and businesses involved in proxy matters and other
nontrading activities suddenly become subject to tremendous liabil-
ity.' 1 5 For instance, a person who refrained from buying stock due to
fraudulent negative information currently does not have a claim under
the securities laws for failure to meet the standing requirement. 16
However, under the broad interpretation of RICO, a multitude of suits
U.S. 6, 13 (1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54
(1972).
107. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748 (1975). The Court
stated:
[I]f Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of action for damages,
the duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer the law which Congress
enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred
because of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of
creating so expansive a liability.
Id.
108. Pitt, supra note 16, at 31.
109. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1327 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990);
Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).
112. Vigman, 908 F.2d at 1466; Warner, 828 F.2d at 1530.
113. Tobenkin, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting Jack Samet, Holmes' attorney) ("The whole
idea that a person must be a purchaser of a stock to sue would be moot.").
114. Associated General Contractors of Ca., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983). Apportionment raises the overall costs of recovery
by creating complex issues in determining each plaintiffs damages. In addition, dividing
the damages among a larger number of plaintiffs diminishes the benefits to each plaintiff,
possibly reducing the incentive to sue. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745
(1977).
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would appear featuring plaintiffs who claim they would have bought se-
curities but abstained."17 In addition, from a public policy standpoint,
this approach appears "somewhat out of kilter with the current mood in
Washington," 18 which favors legal reform designed to reduce frivolous
litigation. '19
The courts' endorsement of this approach should come as no sur-
prise to persons who followed the development of the RICO statute.
Beginning in the early 1980's, people speculated that RICO would even-
tually work in favor of the securities fraud plaintiff.'12 0 Those favoring
this view of Holmes would argue Congress could easily see RICO has
emerged as a well-used tool in securities fraud actions and would have
made changes in the law if necessary. ' 2 ' Therefore, claim the advocates
of RICO, Congress inherently favors the liberal approach and the courts
should not attempt to restrict RICO in favor of a narrow approach.1
22
B. Proximate Cause Is Required In Addition To The Purchaser-Seller
Limitation
The lower courts may interpret the Court's decision to mean that a
person who was not a purchaser or seller of securities cannot fulfill the
proximate cause requirement.' 23 Thus, until Congress explicitly states
otherwise, the standing requirements firmly established for securities
fraud actions under Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule lOb-5 continue to apply to RICO cases as well. Even though
the majority did not specifically address the purchaser-seller issue, they
"strongly hinted their commitment" to the rule, 12 4 asserting that
problems with allowing indirectly injured plaintiffs to bring causes of
action would burden the judicial system.' 2 5 The Fourth Circuit will
probably favor this approach, based on its 1987 opinion in International
Data Bank v. Zepkin,' 26 in which it interpreted Congress's actions (or lack
thereof) relating to the purchaser-seller issue to mean the approval of
117. Id.
118. Pitt, supra note 16, at 31.
119. Id. The authors added, "This approach eschews uniformity and predictability
under the law and runs counter to the growing consensus of the American public and its
leaders that efforts should be made to control litigation, not to encourage the filing of even
more suits." Id. at 33.
120. See Bridges, supra note 14, at 45 ("Private RICO may be for the eighties what rule
lOb-5 was for the seventies."); Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organi-
zations Act: Powerful New Tool Of The Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 KAN. L. REV. 7, 12 (1982)
("there is some support that RICO may relax at least one of the substantive limitations to
an action under rule lOb-5-that the plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of
securities.").
121. Brodsky, supra note 101, at 3.
122. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor claimed that Congress expressly cre-
ated the right for nonpurchasers and nonsellers to sue. Holmes v. Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1327 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981)).
123. Leigh, supra note 105, at 8 (referring to comments by Jack Samet, attorney for
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124. Campbell, supra note 115, at 5.
125. Holmes 112 S. Ct. at 1321 (1992).
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the retention of Rule lOb-5's requirements. 12 7 The court stated that
Congress "did not write the RICO statute in a vacuum." 128 By not tak-
ing explicit action, the court found that the legislature indicated a will-
ingness to retain the requirements of the federal securities laws in
RICO. 129
This interpretation of Holmes agrees with the legal community's
view of RICO and securities fraud13 0 and constitutes the most sensible
approach to a confusing situation for several reasons. First, an adoption
of this narrow ruling by the lower courts would certainly reduce the
fears of "vexatious litigation" that cause so much anxiety.' 3 ' A narrow
interpretation of the statute prevents securities plaintiffs from alleging
non-securities fraud RICO offenses to secure a place in the courtroom.
Second, placing limits on which persons can bring a RICO securities
fraud action would help define the securities industry's potential liabil-
ity' 3 2 and redirect conventional securities fraud actions away from
RICO to the appropriate controlling securities laws. In fact, a move-
ment exists to eliminate securities fraud completely as a cause of action
under RICO.13 3 Finally, Congress designed RICO as "an aggressive in-
itiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fight-
ing crime,"_1 3 4 not as an unrestricted panacea for plaintiffs and a means
for skirting federal securities laws.
The jury is still out in terms of how this case will influence the legal
community.' 3 5 No clear answer exists as to which parties this decision
will affect the most.' 3 6 On one hand, the Court narrowed RICO by
firmly establishing proximate cause as a requirement, while on the other
hand it conceivably broadened the rule by not enforcing the purchaser-
seller limitation for securities fraud actions. 13 7 If future decisions elimi-
nate the purchaser-seller requirement as a result of Holmes, the net effect
127. Id. at 152.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Edward F. Brodsky, RICO And The Securities Laws, N.Y. L. J., June 12,
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33 (controlling litigation is the consensus in America).
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to encourage litigation for securities fraud."). The Securities and Exchange Commission
proposed that Congress revise RICO to eliminate lawsuits based on violations of securities
fraud. See Pitt, supra note 16, at 31.
134. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985). However, the dissent
argues that RICO essentially eradicated the precedent that developed over time. Justice
Marshall claimed that the securities law precedent "is now an endangered species because
plaintiffs can avoid the limitations of the securities laws merely by alleging violations of
other predicate acts." Id. at 505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Jed S. Rakoff, The Supreme Court's Scolding Of RICO, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2, 1992, at 29
(explaining that the decision will simply "muddy the waters" and create uncertainty in the
interpretation of proximate cause).
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will be a limitation on plaintiffs' chances of recovery but an increase in
the number of persons entitled to bring a cause of action.
C. Standing Under the Purchaser-Seller Limitation
When the Supreme Court announced that it granted certiorari in
Holmes, the financial and legal communities believed the case would fi-
nally resolve the RICO issue.13 8 The potential implications arising out
of the decision created substantial interest among followers of securities
law. Prior to the Court's decision, one commentator surmised that an
affirmance of the court of appeals would set an alarming precedent for
averting the standing limitations needed to bring RICO actions based
on other violations,' 3 9 resulting in an increase in the number of frivo-
lous lawsuits filed by plaintiffs far removed from the actual transac-
tion. 140  Proponents of the statute looked forward to a broad
interpretation enabling those with no claims under the securities laws to
access RICO. 141
Instead, neither party came away satisfied with the outcome, for the
Court dodged the question that people most wanted answered. Even
Souter himself recognized the lower courts demanded "much-needed
guidance."' 142 Unless the lower courts can discover a way to use this
opinion to develop a compromise solution, the judicial system must wait
for another RICO/securities fraud case to appear and hope the Court
does not again drop the ball.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting the RICO statute, Congress included "fraud in the sale
of securities" as a predicate offense with a meager amount of support
and reasoning. Thus, courts interpreting RICO in securities fraud ac-
tions had little guidance as to whether the purchaser-seller standing lim-
itation previously implied by the courts in a Rule lOb-5 action also
applied to RICO. The ensuing confusion resulted in conflicting deci-
sions among the federal circuits.
In Holmes, the SIPC attempted to recover monies paid to customers
of two failed brokerage firms by bringing RICO charges against the de-
fendant. Rather than decide the issue of whether the SIPC had standing
to allege a RICO action, the Court held the actions by the defendant
were not the proximate cause of the losses of the SIPC. The question of
whether the purchaser-seller requirement applies to RICO remains un-
answered. Thus, the federal courts may continue to interpret the issue
138. See supra text accompanying note 4.
139. Brodsky, RICO And The Securities Laws, supra note 130, at 7. The author summa-
rized the arguments on both sides and concluded that the purchaser-seller requirement
should not be eliminated.
140. Tobenkin, supra note 4, at 5 (referring to Holmes's attorney, who said that "law-
yers may increasingly use the RICO law in securities violation cases far removed from the
organized crime activities RICO was designed to fight against").
141. Brodsky, RICO And The Securities Laws, supra note 130, at 7.
142. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992).
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in the same manner as they did prior to Holmes, with some applying the
purchaser-seller standing requirement to RICO cases, and others ignor-
ing the standing requirement required by the securities laws.
In order to remain in harmony with Section l0b of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5, RICO needs to adopt the pur-
chaser-seller requirement used by the federal securities laws in fraud ac-
tions. Limiting the number of potential plaintiffs will prevent frivolous
RICO lawsuits and will constrain securities fraud actions to those that
meet the criteria of the securities laws. By not addressing the purchaser-
seller requirement, the Supreme Court avoided the most important is-
sue in Holmes, and provided no direction for the divided lower courts. If
potential defendants hoped for Holmes to clarify the liability picture,
their wishes went unfulfilled, and they must wait for the next RICO case
for another opportunity.
